Arbeitspapier

Dynamic merger review

We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which may not yet be known to the antitrust authority. We show that, in many cases, this apparently difficult problem has a simple resolution: an antitrust authority can maximize discounted consumer surplus by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger today if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0099

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Kartellrecht
Wettbewerbsaufsicht
Fusion
Konsumentenrente
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Nocke, Volker
Whinston, Michael D.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
(where)
Evanston, IL
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Nocke, Volker
  • Whinston, Michael D.
  • Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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