Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

The Council Presidency: power broker or burden? An emperical analysis

The potential impact of the EU Council Presidency on legislative decision-making has been frequently identified. This article provides an empirical analysis of the Presidency's influence on decision outcomes based on a large-n data set. Two counterfactuals are used to represent consensual decision-making and hard bargaining in the Council. The role of supranational actors is controlled for directly. The findings show that a member state benefits from holding the Presidency during the final stages of the legislative proceedings. Besides the support of supranational actors, the regression analysis controls for the voting threshold, the type of proposal and salience.

The Council Presidency: power broker or burden? An emperical analysis

Urheber*in: Warntjen, Andreas

Free access - no reuse

Extent
Seite(n): 315-338
Language
Englisch
Notes
Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

Bibliographic citation
European Union Politics, 9(3)

Subject
Politikwissenschaft
Europapolitik
politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Warntjen, Andreas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(when)
2008

DOI
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-229389
Rights
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
Last update
21.06.2024, 4:26 PM CEST

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Object type

  • Zeitschriftenartikel

Associated

  • Warntjen, Andreas

Time of origin

  • 2008

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