Pluralism, Kant and Progress

Abstract: Vittorio Hösle’s reply helpfully clarifies his ethical position but raises three questions from a value-pluralist point of view. First, is the Kantian starting point he proposes a monist position that undercuts the value pluralism to which he says he is committed? Second, in what sense does he accept the central pluralist idea of the incommensurability of values? In particular, what kind of constraint does he believe this places on the rank ordering of values? The formulations he offers are ambiguous between allowing contextual ordering, which is widely endorsed by pluralists, and permitting a comprehensive order that applies in all cases, which most pluralists would reject. Third, Hösle’s commitment to the cause of progress is admirable, but how can this be squared with pluralism? Here, I return to the broad approaches to the problem of pluralist ranking that I identified in my original reply to Hösle.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Pluralism, Kant and Progress ; volume:40 ; number:1 ; year:2018 ; pages:191-198 ; extent:8 ; Analyse & Kritik ; 40, Heft 1 (2018), 191-198 (gesamt 8)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Crowder, George

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/auk-2018-0009
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023120713023625091039
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:22 AM CEST