Arbeitspapier
Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions
The two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or evolve as sellers who care for sales in addition to profits. Whereas strategic delegation does not change the market results as compared to the usual duopoly solution, indirect evolution causes a more competitive behavior. Thus the case at hand suffices to demonstrate the difference between the two approaches in explaining economic institutions.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1997,28
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Dufwenberg, Martin
Güth, Werner
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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1997
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064149
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dufwenberg, Martin
- Güth, Werner
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Time of origin
- 1997
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