Symmetric Markovian games of commons with potentially sustainable endogenous growth

Arbeitspapier

Differential games of common resources that are governed by linear accumulation constraints have several applications. Examples include political rent-seeking groups expropriating public infrastructure, oligopolies expropriating common resources, industries using specific common infrastructure or equipment, capital-flight problems, pollution, etc. Most of the theoretical literature employs specific parametric examples of utility functions. For symmetric differential games with linear constraints and a general time-separable utility function depending only on the player's control variable, we provide an exact formula for interior symmetric Markovian-strategies. This exact solution, (a) serves as a guide for obtaining some new closed-form solutions and for characterizing multiple equilibria, and (b) implies that, if the utility function is an analytic function, then the Markovian strategies are analytic functions, too. This analyticity property facilitates the numerical computation of interior solutions of such games using polynomial projection methods and gives potential to computing modified game versions with corner solutions by employing a homotopy approach.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CFS Working Paper Series ; No. 638

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity: General ; Environment and Growth
• Thema: differential games ; endogenous growth ; tragedy of the commons ; Lagrange-d'Alembert equation ; analytic functions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hakobyan, Zaruhi ; Koulovatianos, Christos
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/213007
• URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-525435
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ