- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783826555749
3826555740
- Maße
-
21 cm
- Umfang
-
II, 65 S.
- Ausgabe
-
Als Ms. gedr.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
graph. Darst.
Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 1997
- Schlagwort
-
Arbeitsmarkt
Adverse Selektion
Kontrakttheorie
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
11.06.2025, 13:43 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
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Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
- Kübler, Dorothea
- Shaker
Entstanden
- 1997
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