Arbeitspapier
Simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement and regulation
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0016
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Agency Theory
Öffentliche Beschaffung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Rogerson, William P.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Rogerson, William P.
- Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
Entstanden
- 2001
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