Arbeitspapier
Import tariffs and export subsidies in the World Trade Organization: A small-country approach
This paper develops a simple small-country model to explain why the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibits export subsidies but allows import tariffs. Governments choose protection rates (import tariffs/export subsidies) to maximize a weighted sum of social welfare and lobbying contributions. While transportation costs decrease due to the progress of trade liberalization and lower transportation costs, import-competing sectors decline but export industries grow. In the growing export industries, the surplus generated by protection is eroded by new entrants. Therefore, the rent that governments gain from protecting the export sectors by using export subsidies is small. On the other hand, in the import-competing sectors, capital is sunk and no new entrants erode the protection rent. Therefore, governments can get large political contributions from protecting these import-competing sectors. This paper shows that under fast capital mobility, governments with a high bargaining power are better off than with a trade agreement that allows import tariffs but prohibits export subsidies.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: ARTNeT Working Paper Series ; No. 119
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- Subject
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export subsidy agreement
import tariff
WTO
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Potipiti, Tanapong
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT)
- (where)
-
Bangkok
- (when)
-
2012
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Potipiti, Tanapong
- Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT)
Time of origin
- 2012
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