Arbeitspapier

Hedge funds, financial intermediation, and systemic risk

Hedge funds are significant players in the U.S. capital markets, but differ from other market participants in important ways such as their use of a wide range of complex trading strategies and instruments, leverage, opacity to outsiders, and their compensation structure. The traditional bulwark against financial market disruptions with potential systemic consequences has been the set of counterparty credit risk management (CCRM) practices by the core of regulated institutions. The characteristics of hedge funds make CCRM more difficult as they exacerbate market failures linked to agency problems, externalities, and moral hazard. While various market failures may make CCRM imperfect, it remains the best line of defense against systemic risk.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Staff Report ; No. 291

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Subject
banks, counterparty credit risk management, liquidity
Hedgefonds
Finanzintermediär
Kreditrisiko
Systemrisiko

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kambhu, John
Schuermann, Til
Stiroh, Kevin J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(where)
New York, NY
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kambhu, John
  • Schuermann, Til
  • Stiroh, Kevin J.
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Time of origin

  • 2007

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