Elite collective agency and the state

Arbeitspapier

The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination. Elites' challenge is to simultaneously deter the state from abusing power while at the same time relying on it to discipline defectors in their midst. The basic insight holds that the credibility of the state's threats depends on the cost of carrying them out, which elites can have control over if they can act in tandem. Elites can coordinate in being compliant when the ruler's threats serve their collective interest which raises the threats' credibility, while lowering that of those they dislike by their coordinated noncompliance making them costly to carry out.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2019-04

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
• Subject: elite collective agency ; state power ; coordination ; credible threats ; subgame imperfect equilibrium

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ertürk, Korkut A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The University of Utah, Department of Economics
• (where): Salt Lake City, UT
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/261010
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET