Trade credit financing for supply chain coordination under financial challenges: a multi-leader–follower game approach
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
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2199-4730
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Trade credit financing for supply chain coordination under financial challenges: a multi-leader–follower game approach ; volume:9 ; number:1 ; day:4 ; month:1 ; year:2023 ; pages:1-39 ; date:12.2023
Financial innovation ; 9, Heft 1 (4.1.2023), 1-39, 12.2023
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1186/s40854-022-00401-1
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023031320594944815922
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 11:00 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Emtehani, Faranak
- Nahavandi, Nasim
- Rafiei, Farimah Mokhatab
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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