Arbeitspapier

The power of parties

As with the market for goods and services, democratic competition involves political parties offering their services (policy programs) to citizen-consumers who vote for their preferred partisan supplier. Little is known about the partial effect of a shift in parties' seat shares for given voter preferences, particularly in proportional representation systems. We estimate party effects using a regression discontinuity design tailored to proportional systems. Based on rich local government data, the analyses show that parties matter for fiscal policies. A larger left-wing party leads to more property taxation and higher user charges. It also leads to higher spending on child care but less on old-age care. These effects are caused both by changes in the representation of individual parties and by shifts between the party blocs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4119

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Thema
fiscal policy
proportional representation
regression discontinuity design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fiva, Jon H.
Folke, Olle
Sørensen, Rune J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fiva, Jon H.
  • Folke, Olle
  • Sørensen, Rune J.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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