Cheap talk about the detection probability

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes whether the behavior of potential offenders can be guided by information on the actual detection probability transmitted by the policy maker. It is established that, when viewed as a cheap-talk game, the existence of equilibria with information transmission depends on the level of the sanction, the level of costs related to imposing the sanction, and the level of social harm resulting from the offense. In addition, we find that the policy maker (i.e., society as a whole) is not necessarily better off ex ante when more information is transmitted in equilibrium, but that potential offenders always are.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-089-5
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 90

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: crime ; cheap talk ; law enforcement ; imperfect information

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Baumann, Florian ; Friehe, Tim
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (where): Düsseldorf
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71290
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET