Arbeitspapier
Auction design and the success of national 3G spectrum auctions
This study empirically examines a sample of national wireless spectrum assignments for the period 2000-2007 to identify the sources of revenue variations. An econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid (per Mhz) values to auction design variables (license award process), national and mobile market conditions, spectrum package attributes and post-award obligations identified from national regulatory authority tender documents. The analysis reveals that most auction design variables independently impact on realized 3G spectrum auction revenue in a manner consistent with auction theory.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1007
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Telecommunications
- Thema
-
wireless telephone markets
3G spectrum auctions
spectrum bid price
Mobilkommunikation
Netzzugang
Auktion
Auktionstheorie
Türkei
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Madden, Gary
Sağlam, Ismail
Morey, Aaron
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
TÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum
- (wo)
-
Istanbul
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Madden, Gary
- Sağlam, Ismail
- Morey, Aaron
- TÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum
Entstanden
- 2010
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