The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
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Agency-Theorie ; Anreizsystem ; Theorie
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Mannheim
- (wer)
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Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
- (wann)
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1997
- Urheber
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-28874
- Rechteinformation
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Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:58 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Müller, Holger M.
- Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
Entstanden
- 1997
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