Attention manipulation and information overload

Arbeitspapier

When a decision-maker's attention is limited, her decisions depend on what she focuses on. This gives interested parties an incentive to manipulate not only the substance of communication but also the decision-maker's attention allocation. This paper models such attention manipulation. In its presence, competitive information supply can reduce the decision-maker's knowledge by causing information overload. Further, a single information provider may deliberately induce information overload to conceal information. These findings, pertinent to consumer protection, suggest a role for rules that restrict communication, mandate not only the content but also the format of disclosure, and regulate product design.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 995

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Consumer Protection ; Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation
• Subject: Communication ; Information Overload ; Limited Attention ; Persuasion ; Disclosure ; Complexity ; Consumer Protection ; Salience

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Persson, Petra
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95639
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET