Arbeitspapier

Tax Evasion in a Unionised Economy

In a unionised labour market, a substitution of a payroll for an income tax will not alter employment if tax obligations are fulfilled. However, if workers or firms can evade taxes this irrelevance result might no longer apply. This will especially be the case if the fine for tax evasion depends on undeclared income or on wage payments or if withholding regulations prevent optimal evasion choices. In such instances, tax evasion opportunities make the legal incidence of taxes an important determinant of their economic incidence and employment can rise with a substitution of an income for a payroll tax.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 382

Classification
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Subject
Economic incidence
legal incidence
penalty
tax evasion
trade union
Steuerkriminalität
Lohnsteuer
Einkommensteuer
Steuerwirkung
Lohnverhandlungstheorie
Gewerkschaft
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Goerke, Laszlo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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