Not just babble: A voluntary contribution experiment with iterative numerical messages

Arbeitspapier

When subjects can make non-binding announcements of possible contributions to a public good numerically, there is no effect on average level of contributions in a public goods experiment relative to play without announcements. But a detailed analysis of this experiment shows that pre-play announcements increased the variance of achieved cooperation among groups, leading both to more highly cooperative groups and to more thoroughly uncooperative groups than in a treatment without announcements. We also add a treatment in which subjects can select a statement of (non-binding) “promise” to contribute a certain amount and we find that even though subjects were instructed that promise statements were not binding, the ability to issue them significantly increased both contributions and earnings in a treatment that includes costly punishment opportunities, although not in a treatment without punishment.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2005-05

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Public Goods ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
• Subject: Public goods ; collective action ; communication ; punishment ; cheap talk ; Öffentliches Gut ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bochet, Olivier ; Putterman, Louis
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Brown University, Department of Economics
• (where): Providence, RI
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80122
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET