Physician performance pay: Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Arbeitspapier

We present causal evidence from a controlled experiment on the effect of pay for performance on physicians' behavior and patients' health benefits. At a within-subject level, we introduce performance pay to complement either fee-for-service or capitation. Performance pay is granted if a health care quality threshold is reached, and varies with the patients' severity of illness. We find that performance pay significantly reduces overprovision of medical services due to fee-for-service incentives, and underprovision due to capitation; on average, it increases the patients' health benefit. The magnitude of these effects depends, however, on the patients' characteristics. We also find evidence for a crowding-out of patient-regarding behavior due to performance pay. Health policy implications are discussed.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86788-764-9
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 658

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Analysis of Health Care Markets
• Thema: Fee-for-service ; capitation ; pay for performance ; laboratory experiment ; crowding-out

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Brosig-Koch, Jeannette ; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike ; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja ; Wiesen, Daniel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
• (wo): Essen
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.4419/86788764
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148309
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ