Konferenzbeitrag
Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations
We study an informed-principal framework in which the principal chooses the variables the agent is aware of. The agent fits a causal model connecting these variables to the objective probability distribution. The principal may keep her unaware of some variables so that she incorrectly extrapolates how non-equilibrium actions map into outcomes. This framework captures models of contracting with unaware agents, shrouded attributes, and overconfidence in a unified manner.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Contract Theory ; No. G09-V1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schumacher, Heiner
Thysen, Heidi
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Kiel, Hamburg
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Schumacher, Heiner
- Thysen, Heidi
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2017
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