Blanket guarantee and restructuring decisions for multinational banks in a bargaining model

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines blanket guarantee and restructuring decisions in respect of a multinational bank (MNB) using Nash bargaining, when the threat of a panic motivates countries to take decisions quickly. The failure of the bank would cause unevenly distributed externalities between the countries concerned, which influences restructuring incentives. In equilibrium, the bank is either liquidated or one or both of the countries recapitalizes it. The partition of the recapitalisation costs is sensitive to the country-specific benefits and costs from recapitalisation, panics and liquidation. The home regulator benefits from the privilege of being the only entity that can legally liquidate the MNB. Rational expectations regarding the bargaining result affect the incentives to declare a blanket guarantee.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-952-462-517-3
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 16/2009

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka ; Mälkönen, Ville
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bank of Finland
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/212137
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET