Arbeitspapier
Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard
Student loans, even income-contingent ones, are not optimal. Potential university students with the appropriate characteristics should be offered a scholarship, dependent on both need and merit. The award of the scholarship should be conditional on the choice of university degree, but students with a natural aptitude for studies that do not hold the prospect of a well paid job should not be pushed towards potentially more lucrative ones. The scheme should be financed by a graduate tax that re-distributes from the better paid to the academically more successful.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 973
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Education: Government Policy
- Subject
-
scholarships
student loans
graduate tax
principal-agent
moral hazard
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Cigno, Alessandro
Luporini, Annalisa
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cigno, Alessandro
- Luporini, Annalisa
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2003
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