Arbeitspapier

Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard

Student loans, even income-contingent ones, are not optimal. Potential university students with the appropriate characteristics should be offered a scholarship, dependent on both need and merit. The award of the scholarship should be conditional on the choice of university degree, but students with a natural aptitude for studies that do not hold the prospect of a well paid job should not be pushed towards potentially more lucrative ones. The scheme should be financed by a graduate tax that re-distributes from the better paid to the academically more successful.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 973

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Education: Government Policy
Thema
scholarships
student loans
graduate tax
principal-agent
moral hazard

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cigno, Alessandro
Luporini, Annalisa
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cigno, Alessandro
  • Luporini, Annalisa
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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