Arbeitspapier

Minimum Wage and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence

The paper investigates the role of the minimum wage in a competi- tive economy in which there is underreporting of earnings by employed labour. The minimum wage induces higher compliance by some low- productivity workers and transforms a nominally neutral .scal system into a regressive one. A spike in the wage distribution at the mini- mum wage level appears and a positive correlation between the size of the spike and the size of the informal economy is predicted and documented using cross-country data for Europe. A further result is that employees whose officially declared earnings appear to be boosted by a minimum wage hike actually experience a decline in their true income. This prediction finds support in an empirical test using the massive increase in the minimum wage that took place in Hungary in 2001 as a quasi-natural experiment.

ISBN
978-963-9588-93-6
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2007/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
Subject
Minimum Wage
Tax Evasion
Wage Distribution
Hungary
Mindestlohn
Steuervermeidung
Schattenwirtschaft
Lohnstruktur
Ungarn

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Tonin, Mirco
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(where)
Budapest
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Tonin, Mirco
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2007

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