Arbeitspapier
Sabotaging potential rivals
This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1500
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
all-pay auction
elimination contests
potential rival
sabotage
Wirtschaftskriminalität
Wettbewerb
Auktionstheorie
Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Amegashie, J. Atsu
Runkel, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Amegashie, J. Atsu
- Runkel, Marco
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2005
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