Voluntary 'donations' versus reward-oriented 'contributions': Two experiments on framing in funding mechanisms
Abstract: In an artefactual field experiment, we implemented a crowdfunding campaign for an institute's summer party and compared donation and contribution framings. We found that the use of the word 'donation' generated higher revenue than the use of 'contribution'. While the individuals receiving the donation framing gave substantially larger amounts, those receiving the contribution framing responded more strongly to reward thresholds and suggestions. An additional survey experiment on MTurk indicated that the term 'donation' triggers more positive emotional responses and that emotions are highly correlated with giving. It appears that making a donation is perceived as a more voluntary act and is thus more successful at generating warm glow than making a contribution. We surmise that this extends to other funding mechanisms
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource, 22 S.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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Veröffentlichungsversion
begutachtet
- Erschienen in
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels ; Bd. SP II 2016–308r2
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Soziale Probleme, Sozialdienste, Versicherungen
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Mannheim
- (wer)
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SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
- (wann)
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2022
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Berlin
- (wer)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- (wann)
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2022
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022101813170761715706
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:36 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Adena, Maja
- Huck, Steffen
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
Entstanden
- 2022
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