Arbeitspapier
Justice is in the eyes of the beholder: Eye tracking evidence on balancing normative concerns in torts cases
Frequently deciding legal cases requires an assessment in multiple, conceptually incompatible dimensions. Often one normative concern would call for one decision, and another normative concern for a different decision. The decision-maker must engage in balancing, with no help from overarching normative theory. A typical situation is torts. The decision must regularly balance concerns on behalf of the victim, the tort feasor and society at large, both on utilitarian and deontological grounds. In this paper we use eye tracking to investigate in which ways laypersons' thought processes react to normative conflict in a set of 16 torts vignettes. If normative conflict is present, participants are less likely to agree with the likely outcome if the case were tried in a German court; they take longer to decide, and they fixate longer on normative concerns presented on a decision screen. Eye movements show that participants indeed consider multiple normative concerns in competition.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2020/3
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
- Subject
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torts
fundamental normative relativity
compensation
deterrence
utilitarianand deontological concerns
balancing
eye tracking
machine learning
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Engel, Christoph
Rahal, Rima Maria
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2020
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Engel, Christoph
- Rahal, Rima Maria
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2020
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