Arbeitspapier
Markets and contracts
Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive, anonymous markets are viable. For a generic economy, there exist a Pareto improving intervention via linear, anonymous taxes.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2001-36
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
Incomplete Markets
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
-
asymmetric information
competitive markets
equilibrium
Asymmetrische Information
Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Bisin, A
Geanakoplos J. D.
Gottardi P.
Minelli E.
Polemarchakis H.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Brown University, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Providence, RI
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
20.09.2024, 8:23 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bisin, A
- Geanakoplos J. D.
- Gottardi P.
- Minelli E.
- Polemarchakis H.
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2001
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