On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strategically whether to apply for a patent with probabilistic validity or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rivals' beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. A Cournot competitor tends to patent big innovations, and keep small innovations secret, while a Bertrand competitor adopts the reverse strategy. Increasing the number of firms gives a greater (smaller) patenting incentive for Cournot (Bertrand) competitors. Increasing the degree of product substitutability increases the incentives to patent the innovation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 339

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• Subject: Bertrand and Cournot competition ; oligopoly ; productdifferentiation ; Immaterielle Güter ; Innovation ; Prozessmanagement ; Patent ; Asymmetrische Information ; Duopol

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Jansen, Jos
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2010

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13215
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94137
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13215-4
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET