The termination of international sanctions : explaining target compliance and sender capitulation
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
In: European Economic Review ; 129 (2020). - 103565. - Elsevier. - ISSN 0014-2921. - eISSN 1873-572X
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Konstanz
- (wer)
-
KOPS Universität Konstanz
- (wann)
-
2020
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-qmuej7mfl2co1
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:27 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Attia, Hana
- Grauvogel, Julia
- Soest, Christian von
- KOPS Universität Konstanz
Entstanden
- 2020
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018 : Introducing the IST dataset
Biased Coercion : The Imposition, Management, and Termination of US Sanctions
Explaining the Termination of Nationalizations in the Late 1970s
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent
International Sanctions against Iran under President Ahmadinejad: Explaining Regime Persistence
International sanctions against Iran under president Ahmadinejad : explaining regime persistence
EU Anti-Russian Sanctions (Restrictive Measures): Compliance with International Law
Political Goals, Economic Constraints: Explaining the Motivation and Effects of Economic Sanctions
Compliance with core labor standards : explaining (non-) compliance with core labor standards in developing countries
Emotions, crisis, and institutions: Explaining compliance with COVID‐19 regulations
Lower sanctions, greater antitrust compliance? Cartel conduct with imperfect information about enforcement risk
Lower Sanctions, Greater Antitrust Compliance? Cartel Conduct with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk
International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018 : Introducing the IST dataset
Biased Coercion : The Imposition, Management, and Termination of US Sanctions
Explaining the Termination of Nationalizations in the Late 1970s
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent
International Sanctions against Iran under President Ahmadinejad: Explaining Regime Persistence
International sanctions against Iran under president Ahmadinejad : explaining regime persistence
EU Anti-Russian Sanctions (Restrictive Measures): Compliance with International Law
Political Goals, Economic Constraints: Explaining the Motivation and Effects of Economic Sanctions
Compliance with core labor standards : explaining (non-) compliance with core labor standards in developing countries
Emotions, crisis, and institutions: Explaining compliance with COVID‐19 regulations
Lower sanctions, greater antitrust compliance? Cartel conduct with imperfect information about enforcement risk
Lower Sanctions, Greater Antitrust Compliance? Cartel Conduct with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk
International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018 : Introducing the IST dataset
Biased Coercion : The Imposition, Management, and Termination of US Sanctions
Explaining the Termination of Nationalizations in the Late 1970s
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent
International Sanctions against Iran under President Ahmadinejad: Explaining Regime Persistence
International sanctions against Iran under president Ahmadinejad : explaining regime persistence
EU Anti-Russian Sanctions (Restrictive Measures): Compliance with International Law
Political Goals, Economic Constraints: Explaining the Motivation and Effects of Economic Sanctions
Compliance with core labor standards : explaining (non-) compliance with core labor standards in developing countries
Emotions, crisis, and institutions: Explaining compliance with COVID‐19 regulations
Lower sanctions, greater antitrust compliance? Cartel conduct with imperfect information about enforcement risk