Leaders, Followers, and Risk Dynamics in Industry Equilibrium

Konferenzbeitrag

We study own and rival risk in a dynamic duopoly with a homogeneous output good. A competitor's options to adjust capacity reduce own-firm risk through a simple hedging channel. For example, if a rival possesses a growth option, an increase in industry demand directly enhances current profits but also encourages value-reducing competitor expansion. As a consequence, when a leader and a follower emerge in equilibrium, risk dynamics depart substantially from previously-studied simultaneous move benchmarks. Own-firm and competitor required returns tend to move together through contractions and oppositely during expansions, providing testable new empirical predictions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Dynamic Models of Investment ; No. D8-V2

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies; Capacity ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
• Thema: Growth options and industry risk ; asset pricing and investment decisions ; risk dynamics in oligopolistic industries

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Carlson, Murray ; Dockner, Engelbert ; Fisher, Adlai ; Giammarino, Ron
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37484
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ