Arbeitspapier
Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption
In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 1/2000
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Externalities
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Subject
-
Corruption
reciprocity
fairness
public sector salaries
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Abbink, Klaus
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Abbink, Klaus
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Time of origin
- 2000
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