Optimal adaptive testing: Informativeness and incentives

Artikel

We introduce a learning framework in which a principal seeks to determine the ability of a strategic agent. The principal assigns a test consisting of a finite sequence of tasks. The test is adaptive: each task that is assigned can depend on the agent's past performance. The probability of success on a task is jointly determined by the agent's privately known ability and an unobserved effort level that he chooses to maximize the probability of passing the test. We identify a simple monotonicity condition under which the principal always employs the most (statistically) informative task in the optimal adaptive test. Conversely, whenever the condition is violated, we show that there are cases in which the principal strictly prefers to use less informative tasks.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1233-1274 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
• Thema: Adaptive testing ; dynamic learning ; ratcheting ; testing experts

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Deb, Rahul ; Stewart, Colin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE2914
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197176
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ