Arbeitspapier
Verifying high quality: Entry for sale
When and how do entrepreneurs sell their inventions? To address this issue, we develop an endogenous entry-sale asymmetric information oligopoly model. We show that lowquality inventions are sold directly or used for own entry. Inventors who sell post-entry use entry to credibly reveal information on quality. Incumbents are then willing to pay high prices for high-quality inventions to preempt rivals from obtaining them. Using Swedish data on patents granted to small firms and individuals, we find evidence that high-quality inventions are sold under preemptive bidding competition, post entry.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1186
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
New Firms; Startups
- Thema
-
Acquisitions
Innovation
Start-ups
Ownership
Patents
Verification
Quality
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
Persson, Lars
Svensson, Roger
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
- Persson, Lars
- Svensson, Roger
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Entstanden
- 2017