Arbeitspapier
Verifying high quality: Entry for sale
When and how do entrepreneurs sell their inventions? To address this issue, we develop an endogenous entry-sale asymmetric information oligopoly model. We show that lowquality inventions are sold directly or used for own entry. Inventors who sell post-entry use entry to credibly reveal information on quality. Incumbents are then willing to pay high prices for high-quality inventions to preempt rivals from obtaining them. Using Swedish data on patents granted to small firms and individuals, we find evidence that high-quality inventions are sold under preemptive bidding competition, post entry.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1186
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
New Firms; Startups
- Subject
-
Acquisitions
Innovation
Start-ups
Ownership
Patents
Verification
Quality
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
Persson, Lars
Svensson, Roger
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (where)
-
Stockholm
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
- Persson, Lars
- Svensson, Roger
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Time of origin
- 2017
Other Objects (12)
Verifying OPAL, Pt. 1.. Verifying in the small
Do Low-Quality Products Affect High-Quality Entry? Multiproduct Firms and Nonstop Entry in Airline Markets
Verifying Negative Sentences
Verifying real-time systems
Self-verifying cellular automata
Endogenous switching costs and the incentive for high quality entry
Endogenous switching costs and the incentive for high quality entry
Endogenous switching costs and the incentive for high quality entry
Verifying Visibility-Based Weak Consistency
Verifying families of system configurations
Verifying temporal properties of systems
Verifying Whiley Programs with Boogie
Verifying OPAL, Pt. 1.. Verifying in the small
Do Low-Quality Products Affect High-Quality Entry? Multiproduct Firms and Nonstop Entry in Airline Markets
Verifying Negative Sentences
Verifying real-time systems
Self-verifying cellular automata
Endogenous switching costs and the incentive for high quality entry
Endogenous switching costs and the incentive for high quality entry
Endogenous switching costs and the incentive for high quality entry
Verifying Visibility-Based Weak Consistency
Verifying families of system configurations
Verifying temporal properties of systems
Verifying Whiley Programs with Boogie
Verifying OPAL, Pt. 1.. Verifying in the small
Do Low-Quality Products Affect High-Quality Entry? Multiproduct Firms and Nonstop Entry in Airline Markets
Verifying Negative Sentences
Verifying real-time systems
Self-verifying cellular automata
Endogenous switching costs and the incentive for high quality entry
Endogenous switching costs and the incentive for high quality entry
Endogenous switching costs and the incentive for high quality entry
Verifying Visibility-Based Weak Consistency
Verifying families of system configurations
Verifying temporal properties of systems