Konferenzbeitrag

Disentangling fiscal effects of local constitutions

We apply the difference-in-discontinuities design to disentangle the fiscal effects the governance system conditional on electoral systems. We take advantage of a natural experiment, which involves two institutional reforms in Poland. Our results indicate that a change from parliamentary to presidential form led to lower vertical fiscal imbalance predominantly in the jurisdictions with majoritarian elections and to a lesser extent in municipalities governed by proportional elections.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Institutions ; No. B20-V2

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
State and Local Budget and Expenditures

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Köppl-Turyna, Monika
Kantorowicz, Jarosław
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(where)
Kiel, Hamburg
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Köppl-Turyna, Monika
  • Kantorowicz, Jarosław
  • ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 2017

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