- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
DIW Discussion Papers ; 335
- Schlagwort
-
Steuerwettbewerb
Steuersystem
Ökonomische Theorie der Politik
Public-Choice-Theorie
Arrow-Paradoxon
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wer)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (wann)
-
2003
- Urheber
- Handle
-
10419/18071
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201802154644
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:49 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Borck, Rainald
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Entstanden
- 2003
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