Arbeitspapier
The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information
We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results con rm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 2015/08
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
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Costly voting
Participation games
Mixed strategy equilibrium
Polynomials in Bernstein form
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Nöldeke, Georg
Peña, Jorge
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.5451/unibas-ep61328
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nöldeke, Georg
- Peña, Jorge
- University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
Time of origin
- 2015