Arbeitspapier

The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results con rm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 2015/08

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
Costly voting
Participation games
Mixed strategy equilibrium
Polynomials in Bernstein form

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Nöldeke, Georg
Peña, Jorge
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
(where)
Basel
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.5451/unibas-ep61328
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Nöldeke, Georg
  • Peña, Jorge
  • University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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