Is Rawlsian Justice Bad for the Environment?

Abstract: In this paper I show that Rawls’s contract apparatus in A Theory of Justice depends on a particular presumption that is in conflict with the goal of conserving environmental resources. He presumes that parties in the original position want as many resources as possible. I challenge Rawls’s approach by introducing a rational alternative to maximising. The strategy of satisficing merely goes for what is good enough. However, it seems that under conditions of scarcity Rawls’s maximising strategy is the only rational alternative. I therefore scrutinise the common account of scarcity. I distinguish between absolute and relative scarcity in order to show that scarcity is influenced by our decisions. If we would not accept the claim to as much as possible without further legitimisation, like Rawls does, then scarcity might not be as severe a problem. Finally, I reject Rawls’s proposed solution for dealing with problems of sustainability, namely his idea of the just savings principle. I conclude that Rawlsian Justice as Fairness is bad for the environment.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Is Rawlsian Justice Bad for the Environment? ; volume:28 ; number:2 ; year:2006 ; pages:146-157 ; extent:12 ; Analyse & Kritik ; 28, Heft 2 (2006), 146-157 (gesamt 12)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Schramme, Thomas

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/auk-2006-0202
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2404171631469.481319066237
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 14.08.2025, 10:58 AM CEST