Arbeitspapier

Do Mergers Result in Collusion?

We examine coordinated effects of mergers in the Swedish retail market for gasoline during the period 1986-2002. Despite significant changes in market concentration and many factors conductive to coordination, the empirical analysis shows that the level of coordination is low. In addition, statistical tests reject the hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions result in coordinated effects. In particular, higher market concentration does not result in more collusive behavior and, consequently, the relevance of simple checklists in merger control can be questioned.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 621

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Thema
Merger Control
Collusion
Coordinated Effects
Oligopolistic Dominance
Competition Policy
Fusion
Kartell
Fusionskontrolle
Benzin
Preis
Schweden

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ganslandt, Mattias
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ganslandt, Mattias
  • Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
  • The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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