Arbeitspapier
Terrorism and the state
This paper considers terrorism as an extortion activity. It uses tools from the theory of extortion and from conflict theory to describe how terrorism works, why terrorism is a persistent phenomenon, why terrorism is a violent phenomenon, and how retaliation affects the outcome. The analysis highlights the importance of information aspects and discusses some aspects of the organizational design.
- Alternative title
-
Terrorismus und der Staat
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 02-15
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Subject
-
Terrorism
extortion
credibility
retaliation
Ismaili
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Konrad, Kai A.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
-
2002
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 2002
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