On the optimality of the full cost pricing

Abstract: This article is aimed at defining the full-cost pricing as a leader-follower game in two-tier organizations: (i) the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost; (ii) the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost. In the Cournot oligopoly case, the full-cost pricing is compared with other pricing rules. There exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost, for which the full-cost pricing dominates any other pricing rules, in terms of gross profit

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch
Notes
Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 68 (2008) 1 ; 282-292

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
2008
Creator
Thépot, Jacques
Netzer, Jean-Luc

DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.007
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-264064
Rights
Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
15.08.2025, 7:30 AM CEST

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Associated

  • Thépot, Jacques
  • Netzer, Jean-Luc

Time of origin

  • 2008

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