On the optimality of the full cost pricing
Abstract: This article is aimed at defining the full-cost pricing as a leader-follower game in two-tier organizations: (i) the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost; (ii) the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost. In the Cournot oligopoly case, the full-cost pricing is compared with other pricing rules. There exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost, for which the full-cost pricing dominates any other pricing rules, in terms of gross profit
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 68 (2008) 1 ; 282-292
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (when)
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2008
- Creator
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Thépot, Jacques
Netzer, Jean-Luc
- DOI
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10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.007
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-264064
- Rights
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Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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15.08.2025, 7:30 AM CEST
Data provider
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Thépot, Jacques
- Netzer, Jean-Luc
Time of origin
- 2008