Arbeitspapier

Enforcement and Public Corruption: Evidence from US States

We use high-quality panel data on corruption convictions, new panels of assistant U.S. attorneys and relative public sector wages, and careful attention to the consequences of modeling endogeneity to estimate the impact of prosecutorial resources on criminal convictions of those who undertake corrupt acts. Consistent with “system capacity” arguments, we find that greater prosecutor resources result in more convictions for corruption, other things equal. We find more limited, recent evidence for the deterrent effect of increased prosecutions. We control for and confirm in a panel context the effects of many previously identified correlates and causes of corruption. By explicitly determining the allocation of prosecutorial resources endogenously from past corruption convictions and political considerations, we show that this specification leads to larger estimates of the effect of resources on convictions. The results are robust to various ways of measuring the number of convictions as well as to various estimators.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 2010-08

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
corruption
rent seeking
enforcement
efficiency wage
public sector wages
system capacity
Korruptionsbekämpfung
Rent-Seeking
Effizienzlohn
Vergütungssystem im öffentlichen Dienst
Teilstaat
USA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Alt, James E.
Dreyer Lassen, David
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
(wo)
Copenhagen
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Alt, James E.
  • Dreyer Lassen, David
  • University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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