Artikel

Divert when it does not hurt: The initiation of economic sanctions by US presidents from 1989 to 2015

A dominant argument in the literature is that leaders tend to initiate military disputes in periods plagued by economic distress. This article revisits the diversionary theory and adapts it to the use of economic sanctions in the United States, contending that their use follows a similar diversionary logic. Using a novel dataset on US sanctions from 1989 to 2015, I find that presidents are more likely to use sanctions when unemployment is high and the president's party power in Congress is weak. I show that when doing so presidents opt for sanctions that inflict little harm on the US economy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Review of International Economics ; ISSN: 1467-9396 ; Volume: 32 ; Year: 2023 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 109-131 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
diversion
economic coercion
sanctions
US politics

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Attia, Hana
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wiley
(wo)
Hoboken, NJ
(wann)
2023

DOI
doi:10.1111/roie.12704
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Attia, Hana
  • Wiley

Entstanden

  • 2023

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