Managerial Job Assignment and Imperfect Competition in Asymmetric

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops a model with multiple market locations in which the quality of intangible assets of firms, provided by management, determines the firms? performance. Despite an exante symmetry of potential entrants, the equilibrium assignment of heterogeneous managerial skills to firms tends to be asymmetric. This sorting outcome determines both the goods market structure at single locations and the size distribution of firms. Results are consistent with a number of observed patterns regarding the size distribution of firms and establishments, and the relation of firm size to profitability, productivity, managerial skills and manager remuneration.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 738

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices
• Subject: asymmetric equilibrium ; firm size ; intangible assets ; managerial jobassignment ; Führungskräfte ; Qualifikation ; Intangibles Gut ; Markteintritt ; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb ; Industrieökonomik ; Gleichgewicht ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Grossmann, Volker
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20430
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET