Arbeitspapier
The Interaction between Explicit and Relational Incentives: An Experiment
We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that subjects will choose the payoff dominated game (representing a bad explicit contract), because this game better sustains (implicit) relational incentives backed by either reputational or reciprocity considerations. We also explicitly test how game choice is affected by the length of the repeated game.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 09-030/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Labor Contracts
- Subject
-
relational contracts
explicit incentives
crowding out
experiments
Wiederholte Spiele
Vertrauen
Arbeitsvertrag
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Implizite Kontrakte
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Sloof, Randolph
Sonnemans, Joep
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2009
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Sloof, Randolph
- Sonnemans, Joep
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2009
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