IMF surveillance and financial markets: A political economy analysis

Arbeitspapier

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we analyze the content of Article IV Public Information Notices (PIN), and second, we use the financial market reaction to the release PINs as tools to identify the role of political economy factors for IMF surveillance. For a set of emerging market economies, the paper finds that financial markets react more favorable to PIN releases for politically influential member countries. Moreover, IMF surveillance appears to be systematically more favorable for countries with larger IMF loans outstanding, consistent with the finding in the literature that the IMF may engage in 'defensive surveillance'.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3089

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions ; International Finance: General ; Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance: General
• Thema: IMF ; surveillance ; political economy ; sovereign spreads ; financial markets ; emerging market economies ; Internationale Wirtschaftsorganisation ; Aufsichtsbehörde ; Staatliche Information ; Public Choice ; Ankündigungseffekt ; Börsenkurs ; Öffentliche Anleihe ; Risikoprämie ; Zinsstruktur ; Aufstrebende Märkte ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fratzscher, Marcel ; Reynaud, Julien
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39008
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ