Arbeitspapier
Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 09-02
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Public Goods
- Thema
-
Multiple public facilities
Priority rules
Hierarchical rules
Object-population-monotonicity
Sovereignty
Anonymity
Strategy-proofness
Generalized median rules
Hiding-proofness
Entscheidungstheorie
Wahlverhalten
Öffentliche Güter
Pareto-Optimum
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bochet, Olivier
Gordon, Sidartha
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bern, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Bern
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bochet, Olivier
- Gordon, Sidartha
- University of Bern, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008