Arbeitspapier

Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 09-02

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Public Goods
Thema
Multiple public facilities
Priority rules
Hierarchical rules
Object-population-monotonicity
Sovereignty
Anonymity
Strategy-proofness
Generalized median rules
Hiding-proofness
Entscheidungstheorie
Wahlverhalten
Öffentliche Güter
Pareto-Optimum
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bochet, Olivier
Gordon, Sidartha
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bern, Department of Economics
(wo)
Bern
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bochet, Olivier
  • Gordon, Sidartha
  • University of Bern, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2008

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