Arbeitspapier

Efficiency, communication and honesty

We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have a lexicographic preference, second to the payoffs in the underlying game, for honesty. We formalize this by way of an honesty (or truth) correspondence between actions and statements, and postulate two axioms met by natural languages. The model is applied to finite and symmetric two-player games and we establish that honest communication and play of the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium together characterize the unique evolutionarily stable set in generic and symmetric n×n-coordination games. In particular, this holds even in Aumann's (1990) example of a Pareto dominant equilibrium that is not self-enforcing.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 645

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Thema
efficiency
communication
coordination
honesty
evolutionary stability

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Demichelis, Stefano
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Demichelis, Stefano
  • Weibull, Jörgen W.
  • Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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