Arbeitspapier
Efficiency, communication and honesty
We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have a lexicographic preference, second to the payoffs in the underlying game, for honesty. We formalize this by way of an honesty (or truth) correspondence between actions and statements, and postulate two axioms met by natural languages. The model is applied to finite and symmetric two-player games and we establish that honest communication and play of the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium together characterize the unique evolutionarily stable set in generic and symmetric n×n-coordination games. In particular, this holds even in Aumann's (1990) example of a Pareto dominant equilibrium that is not self-enforcing.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 645
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- Thema
-
efficiency
communication
coordination
honesty
evolutionary stability
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Demichelis, Stefano
Weibull, Jörgen W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Demichelis, Stefano
- Weibull, Jörgen W.
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Entstanden
- 2006