More Communication, Less Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games

Arbeitspapier

It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Pre-play communication only has a significant impact on cooperation when no intraplay communication is possible. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2007:4

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: Renegotiation ; Communication ; Cooperation ; Experiments

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Andersson, Ola ; Wengström, Erik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (where): Lund
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/259938
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET