Arbeitspapier

Self-control problems and personalized regulation: Sin licenses revisited

We analyze personalized regulation in the form of sin licenses to correct the distortion in the consumption of a harmful good when consumers suffer from varying degrees of self-control problems. We take into account preference uncertainty, which generates a trade-off between flexibility and commitment provided by sin licenses. We also account for the possibility that consumers may trade the sin good in a secondary market, which partially erodes the commitment power of sin licenses. We show that if sophisticated consumers are allowed to choose any general, individualized pricing scheme for sin goods, they will choose a system of sin licenses. Nevertheless, sin licenses do not implement the social optimum in our general setting. We derive a simple criterion for assessing whether switching to a system of sin licenses improves welfare over linear sin taxes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 112

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Thema
self-control problems
sin licenses
non-linear pricing
demand uncertainty
secondary markets

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Haavio, Markus
Kotakorpi, Kaisa
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
(wo)
Turku
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Haavio, Markus
  • Kotakorpi, Kaisa
  • Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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